Deux "Warning Letters" insistent sur la gestion des enregistrements électroniques

Ces deux mises en demeure mettent en évidence des manquements importants dans l'intégrité des enregistrements de laboratoire :
2.    Your firm failed to exercise appropriate controls over computer or related systems to assure that only authorized personnel institute changes in master production and control records, or other records (21 CFR 211.68(b)).
QC personnel created unauthorized folders on laboratory computerized systems without appropriate oversight...
As part of your comprehensive evaluation and risk assessment, include a detailed description of all computerized systems in your facility used for testing drugs. This description should include information on each electronic folder that was not created pursuant to a valid SOP and an assessment of every file in each such folder, including information about the sample (product), date of test, lot number and original test result over the last five (5) years, except for data relating to exhibit batches, in which case there is no time limitation...

Et encore :
2.    Your firm failed to exercise appropriate controls over computer or related systems to assure that only authorized personnel institute changes in master production and control records, or other records (21 CFR 211.68(b)).
FDA investigators discovered a lack of basic laboratory controls to prevent changes to electronically stored data. The following examples show that you lack effective control of the integrity of instrument output data:
a)    The ten Shimadzu HPLC instruments in the QC “commercial” laboratory were configured to send acquired injection data to PCs without audit trails.  

b)    There was a lack of controls to prevent substitution or overwriting of data. The (b)(4) audit trail dated January 6, 2014, for HPLC MLG/QC/12/026 and the (b)(4) audit trail dated January 15, 2014, for HPLCs MLG/QC/12/031 and MLG/QC/12/027 each showed sample injections marked with the same small graphic symbol.  For each of these entries, you replaced the original injection sequence data with data from a single manual injection and failed to save the original sequence data.

In your response to this letter, include a chronology of Chromeleon audit trail information that shows all single manual sample injections that replaced data collected during HPLC testing.

c)    A “File Note” dated February 10, 2014, signed by the QC Head, established that the printed data used for batch disposition decisions from the Metrohm Titrando Instrument MLG/QC/12/048 hard drive was not necessarily the complete data for a batch. Our inspection found that data on the instrument was selected for use and was not protected from change and deletion.  Notably, the audit trail capability of this QC “commercial” laboratory instrument was not enabled, even aftercreation of the “File Note.”  


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